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 This paper is about what I shall call ‘the problem of empty singular thought’. In 
the broadest terms, the problem looks like this. Consider the thought <The Northernmost 
town in Ontario has cold winters>1. This is a ‘descriptive’ thought: a thought the thinking 
of which involves actual or potential grasp of a description, and which is about an object 
iff it is the description’s satisfier. It is plausible that many of our thoughts about 
particulars are descriptive. But it is not plausible that all of them are. There are good 
arguments for the conclusion that we also have ‘singular’ thoughts: thoughts which are 
about objects directly, without descriptive mediation2. For example, consider perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts – thoughts made available by perceptual links with objects and 
standardly expressed using ‘this’ or ‘that’. There are good arguments for taking these 
thoughts to be singular. And there are good arguments for the parallel claim about the 
thoughts we standardly express using proper names. But, on the face of things, there are 
commonplace examples where a subject’s <That is Φ> or <NN is Φ> thoughts fail to be 
about anything. And it is hard to see how a class of thoughts can be made available by 
‘direct’ or ‘unmediated’ relations to the objects they are about if a member of the class 
may be available when it is about nothing.  
 I am going to propose a new solution to this old problem. I shall lay out the 
problem in more detail, then sketch the solution I have in mind.  
 Let us start with two examples of the kind that get the problem off the ground: 
 
Case 1 – A <that>-thought based on a perceptual link with a non-object 
You are having an experience indistinguishable by you from an experience of a rectangular thing in the 
middle distance. You have no reason not to take your experience at face value. You form the belief you 
would express by saying ‘That is rectangular’.  In fact, your experience as of something rectangular is 
caused by a freak combination of a speck on your glasses, a far-off tree, and a building on the horizon. 
 
Case 2 – Thoughts made available by grasp of an empty proper name 
1970’s BBC regulations forbad assignment of a scriptwriting credit to anyone other than a show’s initial 
scriptwriters. So a last-minute change by someone outside the initial scriptwriting group could not be 
credited to the person who made it. Instead, the fact that such a change had been made would be indicated 
by adding ‘David Agnew’ – a name introduced for this purpose – to the list of contributors to the script. 
Seeing ‘David Agnew’ appear repeatedly in BBC credits from this era, and ignorant of the story behind the 
name, you ask X, whom you have always found a reliable informant, and whom you know to have worked 
at the BBC in the 1970’s, whether he knew David Agnew. X says ‘Yes’, and provides you with a range of 
details. You end up with beliefs you would express by saying things like ‘David Agnew was from Bristol’; 
‘David Agnew was an old Etonian’; ‘David Agnew was about 60 in 1975’.  
 
Here are two at least initially plausible claims about these examples: 
                                                 
1 I use pointy brackets to form names for propositions and propositional constituents. 
2 In adopting this definition I am picking up one strand in traditional and contemporary 
debates about singular thought. Other definitions, upon which I cast no aspersions, pick 
up other strands. See Jeshion 2010; Recanati 2010 for summaries. 
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1 Neither your <That is rectangular> belief nor your <David Agnew was an old Etonian> 
belief is about any object. 
 
2 Both your <That is rectangular> belief and your <David Agnew was an old Etonian> 
belief are justified. 
 
1 and 2 are consistent. But now let us add the following: 
 
3 There is justification only where there is truth conditional content: if you are justified in 
believing that <α is Φ>, there is a fact of the matter about what it would take for <α is 
Φ> to be true. 
 
4 If there is a fact of the matter about what it would take for <α is Φ> to be true even 
though there is no object it is about, <α is Φ> is a descriptive thought. 
 
A descriptive thought is true iff (a) its aboutness-fixing description is satisfied; and (b) 
this description’s satisfier has the required property (<The Northernmost town in Ontario 
has cold winters> is true iff there is a unique northernmost town in Ontario, and this town 
has cold winters.) Given (a) and (b), a descriptive thought has truth conditions regardless 
of whether there is any object it is about. 4 is plausible because the descriptivist (a) + (b) 
model is the only viable model of how there might be a fact of the matter about what it 
would take for <α is Φ> to be true even though <α is Φ> is not about anything3. 
1 – 4 entail that your <That is rectangular> and <David Agnew was Φ> thoughts 
are descriptive: in each case, thinking the thought involves grasp of an aboutness-fixing 
description; the thoughts are not about anything because the aboutness-fixing descriptions 
are not satisfied.  
But you can detect no difference in kind between thinking <That is rectangular> 
in Case 1 and thinking <That is rectangular> in a situation where your experience as of 
something rectangular is based on a perceptual feed from a single object, so that this is 
the object your thought is about. Similarly, you can detect no difference in kind between 
thinking <David Agnew was Φ> and thinking <NN was Φ> in a case where your <NN> 
thoughts are also all derived from reliable testimony, but these thoughts are about the 
bearer of ‘NN’. In particular, you can detect no difference between the structure of your 
thoughts in the ‘good’ cases (where your thoughts are about objects) and the ‘bad’ cases 
(where, unbeknownst to you, aboutness fails). But, on the face of things, if there is a 
difference in structure between thoughts, this is a difference detectable by the subject. So, 
since you can detect no structural difference between the cases, there is no such 
difference. And if there is no structural difference between ‘good’ thoughts and ‘bad’ 
ones, it cannot be that ‘bad’ thoughts are descriptive and ‘good’ thoughts not. So we 
seem to have 
 
                                                 
3 I take views on which essaying an empty singular thought involves standing in a relation to a necessarily 
untrue ‘gappy proposition’ (Braun 2005; Garcia-Carpintero 2010) to involve denial that there is a fact of 
the matter about what it would take for the essayed thought to be true.  
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5 If your thoughts in Case 1 and Case 2 are descriptive, all perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts and all thoughts made available by grasp of proper names are descriptive. 
 
But there are good grounds for  
 
6  Neither perceptual demonstrative thoughts nor proper-name-based thoughts are 
descriptive. Rather, these thoughts are singular – when you think a thought of one of 
these kinds about o, you stand in an aboutness-fixing relation to o that does not involve 
grasp of a mediating description. 
 
If 6 is true, one of 1 – 5 must be false. But each of 1 – 5 is initially plausible. So 
anyone who wants to keep 6 has a problem: Which of the initially plausible 1 – 5 should 
be thrown away? I suggest that this formulation gets to the heart of why examples like 
Cases 1-2 have worried proponents of 6. This is the version of the problem of empty 
singular thought that I shall concentrate on solving.  
And here is the solution I am going to propose. Reject 3 – the claim that there is 
justification only where there is truth conditional content; keep everything else.  
In a little more detail, I am going to argue that the possibility of rejecting 3 arises 
from the distinction between what I shall call ‘classical’ and ‘practical’ aboutness-fixing 
relations. If all aboutness-fixing were classical, we would be stuck with 3, and would 
need some other response to the problem of empty singular thought. But some aboutness-
fixing is practical. And where aboutness-fixing is practical, 3 fails: if <α>’s aboutness-
fixing mechanism is practical, a subject may be justified in believing that <α is Φ> even 
though <α is Φ> has no truth-conditional content. 
To keep to a manageable length, I shall focus on the case of perceptual 
demonstrative thought (hereafter just ‘demonstrative thought’). By the end of the paper I 
shall have established an account of aboutness-fixing for demonstrative thoughts 
according to which these thoughts are singular, and Case 1-type examples emerge as 
involving justification for beliefs that lack truth-conditions. Though I shall not protract 
the discussion by arguing for this claim, I am confident that a parallel solution, with 
suitable adjustments, can be given for the 1 – 6 problem as it arises for proper name-
based thoughts.4 I take the fact that it applies to both empty demonstrative thoughts and 
empty proper name-based thoughts to be an advantage of the solution I am going to 
propose.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next two sections develop the 
distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘practical’ aboutness-fixing relations. §4 sketches a 
practical account of perceptual demonstrative aboutness-fixing, and shows how this 
account solves the problem of empty singular thought. §5 compares the practical account, 
and the practical solution to the problem of empty singular thought, with classical 
alternatives.  
 
                                                 
4 Very roughly, the parallel solution requires replacing the notion of justification on the 
basis of perception (which is going to be central to the treatment of perceptual 
demonstratives) with the notion of justification on the basis of uptake from testimony. I 
develop this solution in forthcoming work. 
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§2 Groundwork for the classical/practical distinction – Anscombe on speculative vs. 
practical knowledge5 
 
The distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘practical’ aboutness-fixing relations is 
most easily introduced as an extension of Anscombe’s distinction between speculative 
and practical knowledge. This section gives a brief account of Anscombe’s distinction. §3 
uses Anscombian elements to develop a parallel distinction between kinds of aboutness-
fixing relation. 
As a first step towards Anscombe’s distinction, consider the following example. 
Robin Hood and the Sheriff of Nottingham are shooting at a willow wand 250 yards 
away. Robin is an expert archer, easily able to hit willow wands at this distance in normal 
conditions. The Sheriff is a very poor archer, reliable only given a large, nearby target 
and no wind. Robin and the Sheriff both say ‘I am going to hit that willow wand’. Each 
draws his bow, takes the most careful aim he can, and releases his arrow. Robin hits the 
willow wand. This is to be expected – he almost always hits his target, has hit willow 
wands at 250 yards many times before, and will do so many times again. The Sheriff also 
hits the willow wand. But the Sheriff very seldom hits his declared targets. This is the 
first time he has ever hit a target of anything like this size, or at anything like this 
distance. And, as it turns out, he will never replicate the feat as long as he lives. 
 Now consider the following question. Did each man, at the time when he released 
his arrow, know that he was going to hit the target? 
 In Robin’s case, it is at least plausible that the answer is ‘Yes’. His utterance 
stated his commitment to the claim that he was going to hit the target. So if we allow that 
a cognitive commitment of this kind is a belief, he believed that he was going to hit it. 
His belief turned out true. And it was not just lucky that it turned out true. Given Robin’s 
skills and the conditions, he would have been very unlucky to miss. So Robin’s claim ‘I 
am going to hit that willow wand’ looks like an expression of a true belief that is not just 
luckily true. And a true belief that is not just luckily true is at least a plausible candidate 
to count as knowledge.  
 In the Sheriff’s case, things are different. We can suppose that the Sheriff is self-
deceived about his prowess, so believes that he is going to hit the target. His belief turns 
out true. But the Sheriff’s skill is far below the level required to perform the feat at hand 
with any reliability. So the Sheriff’s belief is merely luckily true. And lucky true belief is 
not knowledge.  
 Suppose we treat the initial statements in the example (‘I am going to hit the 
target’) as statements of intention. And suppose we take at face value the appearance that 
Robin’s statement is a statement of knowledge while the Sheriff’s is a statement of mere 
lucky true belief. Generalising from these suppositions yields two components of 
Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge. The first is the claim that intentions are a 
class of belief, or at least are belief-like in that they involve cognitive commitment to 
their propositional objects: intending to A (or intending to be A-ing) is having an attitude 
                                                 
5 My interpretation of Anscombe in this section is indebted to Velleman 2007a xxi-xxv 
and 2007b.  
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that involves a cognitive commitment to A-ing. The second is the claim that fulfilled 
intentions can count as states of knowledge: if I intend to A (or intend to be A-ing), and I 
actually do A (or actually am A-ing), my intention counts as knowledge (knowledge that 
I will A, or that I am A-ing) iff there is an appropriate relation between my intention and 
my A-ing.6 
The final component of Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge emerges when 
we compare the claim that intentions can count as knowledge to the cases that are central 
to mainstream epistemology. There is a sharp contrast between these standardly discussed 
cases and the kind of knowledge that we might claim to be constituted by fulfilled 
intention. The contrast concerns what we may call the ‘orientation’ of the relation that 
secures the difference between knowledge and mere lucky true belief.  
In the cases on which mainstream epistemology focusses, this relation runs 
inwards, from world to mind: it secures the result that the belief conforms to the world. 
For example, according to standard reliabilism, a true belief counts as knowledge iff it is 
reliably caused by its truthmaker, or reliably caused by a factor reliably causally 
connected with its truthmaker. And on a counterfactual ‘tracking’ view a true belief 
counts as knowledge iff it is formed in such a way that whether or not the subject holds 
the belief depends counterfactually on whether or not it is (or will turn out to be) true (so 
that the counterfactuals ‘If p, S would believe that p’ and ‘If not-p S would not believe 
that p’ both hold).  
Anscombe calls this kind of knowledge ‘speculative knowledge’: S has 
‘speculative knowledge’ that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and S’s formation of the 
belief that p depends on the fact that p (or some fact that determines that it will be the 
case that p) in an appropriate way.7 
In the case of Robin’s knowledge that he is going to hit the target, the orientation 
of the relation between belief and truthmaker is reversed. In this case, the status of the 
belief as more than just luckily true is not secured by a relation that runs inwards, from 
the truthmaker to the belief. It is secured by the role the belief plays in bringing about its 
truthmaker. Given Robin’s skill, when he commits himself to hitting the target it is not 
just a matter of luck that this commitment ends up fulfilled. Rather, Robin’s skill enables 
his intention to be a non-lucky generator of its fulfilment. In the Sheriff’s case, in 
contrast, the fact that the intention ends up fulfilled is just a matter of luck. The Sheriff is 
cognitively committed to the claim that he will hit the target. But given his lack of skill, 
this commitment cannot play the role in bringing about its fulfilment that is required for 
an intention to count as knowledge. 8  
 So whether an intention counts as knowledge does not depend on how it is 
formed. It depends on whether it plays an appropriate role in generating its fulfilment. 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Anscombe’s account of ‘the knowledge that a man has of his 
intentional actions’ at Intention 51-52. For the distinction between knowledge of action in 
intention and mere luckily fulfilled intention see the discussion surrounding Anscombe’s 
claim that the connection between intention and action is not just a ‘grace of fate’ at 51-
53.  
7  See Intention 87, and compare the discussion of ‘contemplative’ knowledge at 57. 
8 Compare Velleman 2007a xii-xv 
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Some philosophers are squeamish about applying the term ‘belief’ to a state of this kind9. 
To avoid terminological wrangling on this score, I shall step back from the claim that 
intentions are a class of belief, and say instead only that intentions are ‘cognitive 
commitments’. With this qualification, the notion of practical knowledge can be 
introduced as follows10: 
I have ‘practical knowledge’ that I will A (or am A-ing) iff 
 
i) I intend to A (or intend to be A-ing), so am cognitively committed to the claim that I 
will A (or am A-ing). 
 
ii) My cognitive commitment turns out to be fulfilled (I will A or am A-ing). 
 
iii) My commitment plays an appropriate luck-eliminating role in generating its 
fulfilment.  
 
Note that (i)-(iii) leave open the question of exactly what role my intention to A 
must play in bringing about my A-ing if the intention is to count as practical knowledge. 
Different answers to this question generate different accounts of practical knowledge. For 
example, one possibility – a possibility which generates a reliabilist notion of practical 
knowledge – is that my intention to A counts as practical knowledge iff it is a reliable 
cause of my A-ing11. Another is a counterfactual view of practical knowledge: my 
intention to A counts as practical knowledge iff there is robust counterfactual dependence 
of my A-ing on my intention to A, so that both ‘If I intended to A then I would A’ and ‘If 
I did not intend to A then I would not A’ are true.  
Note also that the account allows that in many (or even most) cases we have both 
practical knowledge of an intended action and speculative knowledge about it. In many 
cases of action, you observe both yourself moving and the effects of your movements: 
you see and feel your hand holding a piece of sandpaper and moving across a table-top; 
you see the of tip of your arrow line up with the target as you feel yourself pull the bow-
string back. Given other premisses, these observations provide a route to speculative 
knowledge that that you are sanding the table or shooting at the target. But the fact that 
you have (or have available to you) speculative knowledge about your actions does 
nothing to undermine the fact that you also have practical knowledge of them. You may 
have speculative knowledge that you are A-ing, because you are observing yourself A-
ing. But you also have practical knowledge that you are A-ing which does not depend on 
                                                 
9 For example, see Setiya 2008 400-401. 
10 Compare Anscombe Intention 57 ‘…there are two knowledge’s – one by observation, 
the other in intention’; 87: ‘Practical knowledge is “the cause of what it understands”, 
unlike “speculative” knowledge, which is “derived from the objects known”.’ Anscombe 
is quoting Aquinas. 
11 Velleman says that Anscombe’s own account of practical knowledge is reliabilist: 
2007a xiv.  
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observation: you know without observation that you are A-ing because you intend to A, 
you actually are A-ing, and your A-ing is appropriately generated by your intention.12  
In what follows I shall argue that a ‘good’ case of demonstrative thought (a case 
where there is an object the thought is about) involves a form of practical knowledge. The 
mind has something like an intention to represent things outside itself. The information-
processing that lies behind formation of demonstrative thoughts plays a role parallel to 
the role of Robin Hood’s skill: it enables representational intention to generate its 
fulfilment in such a way that it counts as knowledge. A case of empty demonstrative 
thought is like a case of unluckily failed intention: a case where the subject does 
everything required for non-lucky A-ing, but the world does not cooperate (an earthquake 
moves the target; a passing seagull gets hit instead) and the intention goes unfulfilled.  
But to develop this proposal properly I need to extend the notion of practical 
knowledge beyond its initial Anscombian setting. That is the task of the next section. (I 
make no suggestion that Anscombe herself would have endorsed the extensions I am 
about to propose.) 
 
 
§3 Classically vs. practically oriented thought about particulars 
 
 This section extends Anscombe’s distinction between speculative and practical 
knowledge into a distinction between what I shall call ‘classical’ and ‘practical’ 
aboutness-fixing relations. The section has three parts. The first distinguishes between 
what I shall call ‘classical’ and ‘practical’ accounts of how an initial segment of a process 
can set standards for the rest. The second uses examples involving descriptive aboutness-
fixing to show how the distinction between classical and practical standard-setting might 
apply to thought about particulars. The third abstracts away from this initial descriptivist 
setting to give a general distinction between classical and practical aboutness-fixing 
relations. In outline, the suggestion is going to be that an aboutness-fixing relation sets 
standards for the formation of belief; classical aboutness-fixing involves one kind of 
standard-setting; practical aboutness-fixing involves another. (§4 will develop a practical 
account of perceptual demonstrative aboutness-fixing, and show how this account solves 
the problem of empty singular thought.)  
 
§3.1  Classical vs. practical standard-setting 
 
 Consider the following cases: 
 
The Armageddon System  – the Armageddon System is a computer programmed to aim and fire weapons. 
The first stage in an Armageddon cycle – the ‘aiming’ stage –  selects the target, and (in selecting the 
                                                 
12 Anscombe writes ‘Normally someone doing or directing anything makes use of his 
senses, or of reports given him, the whole time…. His sense inform him of what is going 
on….Thus in any operation we really can speak of two knowledge’s – the account that 
one could give of what one was doing, without adverting to observation; and the account 
of what is happening at a given moment (say) to the material one is working on. The one 
is practical, the other speculative.’ (88-89) 
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target), determines the trajectory with which the projectile should be spewed forth; the rest of the cycle (the 
‘firing’ part) consists in various steps involved in spewing forth the projectile with the required trajectory.  
 
The Utopia System – the Utopia System is a computer programmed to deliver workable solutions to cities’ 
urban planning problems. The first stage in a Utopia cycle is selection of a target city. The rest of the cycle 
involves locating the target city’s urban planning problems and developing workable solutions to them.  
 
Now suppose you are an engineer tasked with checking whether each system is 
working properly. In each case, you will probably start with a blunt question. Is the 
Armageddon System destroying the targets it selects? Is the Utopia System generating 
workable solutions to the most obvious problems of the cities it is trained on? But if you 
are doing your job competently, you will not rest with answers to these initial questions. 
For a ‘Yes’ answer to either question over the range of results you are likely to have 
access to does not indicate that the relevant system is working properly – it may be a 
mere matter of luck that the target was destroyed or the urban planning problems solved. 
If you want to know whether one of the systems is working properly, you need to be 
more sophisticated. Each system is of a kind where a cycle’s initial segment (the ‘aiming’ 
part of an Armageddon cycle; the ‘selection’ part of a Utopia cycle) sets standards of 
good order for the rest. In each case, if you want to know whether the system is working 
properly, you need to ask whether the rest of the cycle meets the standards of good order 
that the initial segment determines. And this question brings out a central difference 
between the systems – a difference in how the ‘standard setting’ works. 
Consider the Armageddon System first. In this case, the ‘aiming’ part of a cycle 
also selects a trajectory and force with which the projectile should be spewed forth 
(imagine that the turning of a single dial both brings the target into the cross-hairs and 
selects parameters for the spewing forth of the projectile). So the initial (‘aiming’) 
segment of an Armageddon cycle lays down a template for the remaining (‘firing’) part. 
The ‘firing’ part proceeds in good order if (i) it conforms to the template set by the 
‘aiming’ part, and (ii) it is not just a matter of luck that the ‘firing’ part conforms to this 
template: given the way the system is working, it is reliably the case that the ‘firing’ 
proceeds according to the parameters the ‘aiming’ lays down.  
Now consider the Utopia System. In this case, the initial (‘selecting’) part of a 
cycle does not lay down a template for the rest to follow. Instead, the ‘selection’ stage 
determines a goal – it determines which city’s major urban planning problems are to be 
solved. It is then up to the computer to locate the problems and come up with the best 
solutions. In determining whether the main (‘finding problems; generating solutions’) 
part of the cycle is running as it should, we cannot go back and find parameters set at the 
initial (‘selection’) stage: the selection stage does not set this kind of parameter. Rather, 
we have to look at the various steps the computer takes, and ask whether they will lead, 
reliably, to location of urban planning problems and development of workable solutions.   
 The distinction between these two cases generalises into a distinction between 
two ways that the initial segment of a process might set standards of good order for the 
rest:  
 
Classical standard-setting: the initial segment of a process lays down a template for the 
rest to follow; steps in the rest of the process are in good order iff they tend towards 
producing non-lucky conformity to the template. 
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Practical standard-setting: the initial segment of a process determines a goal; steps in the 
rest of the process are in good order iff they tend towards the goal’s non-lucky fulfilment. 
 
 
The first kind of standard-setting has the orientation of Anscombe’s speculative 
knowledge. The kind of good order required for a belief to count as speculative 
knowledge is a matter of non-lucky conformity: a belief counts as speculative knowledge 
iff it is in non-lucky conformity with the way the world is. Similarly, in a case of classical 
standard-setting, the initial segment of a process sets a template, and steps in the rest of 
the process are in good order iff they are in non-lucky conformity with this template. I 
call this ‘classical’ standard-setting to avoid stretching Anscombe’s terminology too far, 
and to mark the dominance in the philosophical tradition of appeals to standards with this 
orientation.  
I say that the second kind of standard-setting is ‘practical’ because the resulting 
standards have the orientation of Anscombe’s practical knowledge. The kind of good 
order required for an intention to count as practical knowledge is a matter of non-lucky 
fulfilment of a goal. Similarly, in a case of practical standard-setting, the initial segment 
of a process sets a goal, and steps in the rest of the process are in good order iff they tend 
to generate this goal’s non-lucky fulfilment. 
 
3.2 Two examples 
 
 The step from the distinction between classical and practical standard-setting to a 
distinction between classical and practical aboutness-fixing is most easily introduced by 
comparing examples:  
 
Case 3‘Tremulous Hand’  
‘Tremulous Hand’ is used to refer to the otherwise unidentified author of around 50 000 Thirteenth Century 
glosses in Medieval manuscripts. Palaeographical analysis provides very strong evidence that these glosses 
are the work of a single person with distinctive (tremulous and left-leaning) handwriting. All that is known 
about Tremulous Hand is what can be deduced from the glosses themselves. Scholars of Medieval 
manuscripts have used evidence derived from the glosses (evidence about where and when the glosses were 
written; the kind of person who would have had access to the manuscripts in these times and places; and so 
on) to build quite rich bodies of <Tremulous Hand was Φ> beliefs.   
 
Case 4: ‘Casa Nostra’ 
You are participating in deliberations about house-buying. These deliberations involve weighing the 
interests of relevant parties – who would prefer to be able to walk to work; who likes to do what in his or 
her spare time; how serious an issue traffic noise is for everybody concerned. For convenience in the joint 
deliberations you have introduced a name, ‘Casa Nostra’, which you use to have conversations like the 
following: ‘Maybe Casa Nostra should be in that neighbourhood so that you can walk to work.’; ‘Well, this 
isn’t Casa Nostra – it’s right on this ugly intersection.’ Eventually, if you are effective in your 
deliberations, you make a good purchase. ‘Here it is’ you say, as you move in – ‘Casa Nostra at last’.  
 
In each of these cases, a name is introduced using a reference-fixing description (‘the 
author of these glosses’; ‘the house we should buy’). In each case, the name’s bearer (if it 
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has one) is the satisfier of the description.13 And in each case, grasp of the description 
sets standards of good order for development of an associated body of beliefs. But the 
cases come apart with respect to how this standard-setting works.  
Consider ‘Tremulous Hand’ first. In this case, grasp of the initial description 
provides a template for formation of justified <Tremulous Hand> beliefs: move to 
<Tremulous Hand was Φ> given good reason to believe <The author of the glosses was 
Φ>. So, in terms of the distinction introduced in §3.1, the association between 
‘Tremulous Hand’ and its reference-fixing description is a classical standard-setting 
relation: the stipulation that ‘Tremulous Hand’ is to refer to the author of the glosses 
establishes a template for formation of <Tremulous Hand> beliefs; the belief that 
<Tremulous Hand was Φ> is in good order only if it is formed in non-lucky conformity 
to this template.  
Now consider ‘Casa Nostra’. In this case as described14, grasp of the initial 
description (‘the house we should buy’) does not lay down a template for formation of 
justified <Casa Nostra is Φ> beliefs. Early in the decision-making process you have no 
idea of what it would take to satisfy this description. So you cannot try to build your body 
of <Casa Nostra> beliefs by holding the description up against the world looking for 
<The house we should buy is Φ> truths. In this case, ‘good order’ for belief-forming 
moves does not involve intentional conformity to a recipe supplied by the initial 
description. Rather, it involves appropriate exercise of decision-making skill. If you are 
able to bring sufficient decision-making skill to bear, you will develop your body of 
<Casa Nostra> beliefs in such a way as to result in a right house-buying decision; a 
<Casa Nostra> belief is justified iff arrived at in a way that tends towards non-lucky 
generation of this result. This is ‘practical’ standard setting for belief-forming operations 
by grasp of a descriptive conceptual representation: grasp of the description determines a 
goal; you are maintaining your <Casa Nostra is Φ> body of beliefs in good order iff you 
form only <Casa Nostra is Φ> beliefs that tend towards non-lucky fulfilment of this goal.  
These examples give a first indication of how Anscombe’s speculative/ practical 
distinction extends into a contrast between kinds of aboutness-fixing relation. The last 
part of this section shows how to turn this initial, example-driven contrast into a general 
distinction. 
 
§3.3 Classical vs. practical aboutness-fixing relations 
 
 To establish the general distinction between classical and practical aboutness-
fixing relations, let us start with the following principles, which I shall take, for the 
purposed of this discussion, to be foundational:  
 
                                                 
13 Both ‘Tremulous Hand’ and ‘Casa Nostra’ are ‘descriptive names’. Compare Evans 
1982 §2.3. 
14 An anonymous reviewer points out that you might start by engaging in meta-level 
research as to what is most likely to result in the flourishing of people like you, then treat 
the resulting (more detailed) description as a classical template. The reviewer is right, but 
that would be a different case. 
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REFERENCE AND TRUTH – The belief that <α is Φ> is true iff the object <α> refers to is Φ 
(where Φ is the property represented by <Φ>).15  
 
(For example, the belief that <Jack has fleas> is true iff Jack has fleas; the belief that 
<That is square> is true iff the object <that> refers to is square; and so on.) 
 
TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION – Justification homes in on truth, so that, in general, the better 
your justification for a belief, the more likely it is that the belief is true.16 
 
I shall argue that these two principles entail a third, which demands interpretation in 
terms of the claim that reference-fixing is the initial, standard-setting phase of belief-
formation. The general distinction between classical and practical aboutness-fixing is a 
distinction between ways this standard-setting might work.  
 The third principle entailed by REFERENCE AND TRUTH and TRUTH AND 
JUSTIFICATION is 
 
REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION – <α> refers to o iff justification for believing that <α is 
Φ> homes in on getting o’s properties right, so that, in general, the better the subject’s  
justification for believing that <α is Φ>, the more likely it is that o is Φ.  
 
Given REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION, S’s perceptual link with o enables 
demonstrative thought about o iff it makes o the focus of justification for S’s <That is Φ> 
beliefs, so that, across the range of macroscopic observable properties Φ that S is in the 
business of thinking about, if S forms only <That is Φ> beliefs justified on the basis of 
the perceptual link, S will be unlucky if o is not Φ and not merely lucky if it is. Put 
another way, S’s perceptual link with o enables demonstrative thought about o iff it 
secures the truth of the following counterfactual: if S were justified on the basis of the 
perceptual link in believing things like <That is square>, <That is red>, and <That is 
getting closer>, S would be unlucky if o did not match these beliefs and not merely lucky 
if it did.  
 Here is (a short form of17) the argument from REFERENCE AND TRUTH and TRUTH 
AND JUSTIFICATION to REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION:  
                                                 
15 I am taking it that a representation deployable in thought ‘refers to’ what it represents. 
16 For arguments for something like TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION, see Velleman 2000; 
Boghossian 2005. 
17 There are two respects in which a long form of the derivation is more detailed. Firstly, 
the short form rests with the intuitive notions of justification ‘homing in on’ truth and 
‘homing in on’ getting an object’s properties right. The long form cashes out these 
intuitive notions in terms of the notion of a ‘rationally relevant possibility’. (Roughly, the 
idea is that S’s justification for the belief that p ‘homes in on’ truth iff it eliminates every 
rationally relevant possibility where p is not true, where the ‘rationally relevant’ 
possibilities are the possibilities S is rationally required to take into account before 
forming an opinion on p. S’s justification for the belief that <α is Φ> homes in on getting 
o’s properties right iff it eliminates every rationally relevant possibility in which o is not 
Φ.) Secondly, the short form ignores the (arcane) possibility of what I call ‘global 
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1 Suppose (for reductio) that REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION is false. Then either 
(A) There are cases where <α> refers to o but justification for believing that <α is Φ> 
does not home in on getting o’s properties right; or 
(B) There are cases where justification for believing that <α is Φ> homes in on getting 
o’s properties right, but <α> does not refer to o. 
 
REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION is a biconditional. So if it is false, this is either because 
there are situations where its right hand side is true and its left false, or the other way 
around. (A) and (B) state these two possibilities. The rest of the argument shows that, 
given TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATON  and REFERENCE AND TRUTH, both (A) and (B) can be 
ruled out, so the supposition that generates them must be rejected:  
 
2 Consider a type-A case. This is a case where  
(i) <α> refers to o, but  
(ii) justification for believing that <α is Φ> does not home in on whether o is Φ.  
Add REFERENCE AND TRUTH and TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION: 
(iii) <α is Φ> is true iff the referent of <α> is Φ.  
(iv) Justification for a belief homes in on whether the belief is true. 
The combination of (i) and (iii) gives 
(v) <α is Φ> is true iff o is Φ.  
But (ii), (iv), and (v) are inconsistent. So there are no type-A cases. 
 
3 Now consider a type-B case. This is a case where 
(i) justification for believing that <α is Φ> homes in on what o is like, but  
(ii) <α> does not refer to o.  
Add REFERENCE AND TRUTH: 
(iii) <α is Φ> is true iff the referent of <α> is Φ.  
Putting (i), (ii), and (iii) together we get 
(iv) S’s justification for believing that <α is Φ> homes in on a condition that is not the 
condition for the truth of the belief.  
However, given TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION, we have 
(v) The condition for a belief’s truth just is the condition that justification for the belief (if 
it is available) homes in on.  
And (iv) and (v) are inconsistent. So there are no type-B cases.  
 
4 Given 2 and 3, we can reject the supposition at 1, and affirm REFERENCE AND 
JUSTIFICATION.  
 
                                                 
rational entanglement’ – the possibility that, for all Φ, S’s possible justification for 
believing that <α is Φ> might home in on getting both o’s properties right and o*’s 
properties right, for o ≠o*. The need to address this possibility complicates step 3 (the 
consideration of type-B cases). 
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 But a belief-forming process runs to completion in good order (it produces a 
belief that the subject should be forming) only if it results in formation of a justified 
belief.18 So REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION can be reformulated as a claim connecting 
aboutness-fixing with good order for belief formation: 
 
REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION (alternative version) – S’s conceptual representation <α> 
refers to o iff, in general, if S’s <α is Φ> belief-forming processes were to run to 
completion in good order, they would tend towards getting o’s properties right.  
 
 Now recall the distinction between classical and practical standard-setting from 
§3.1. In ‘classical’ standard-setting, the initial segment of a process sets a template for the 
rest to conform to. In ‘practical’ standard-setting, the initial segment sets a goal. 
Combining this contrast with the alternative version of REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION, 
we get the following distinction between classically and practically oriented thought 
about particulars:  
  
Classically oriented thought about particulars – S’s <α is Φ>-thoughts are ‘classically 
oriented’ thoughts about o iff  
(i) S’s grasp of <α> sets a template for subsequent belief-forming moves, so that S’s <α 
is Φ> beliefs would be in good order iff arrived at by moves conforming to this template; 
and 
(ii) <α is Φ> beliefs that meet these standards will tend towards matching what o is like.  
 
Practically oriented thought about particulars – S’s <α is Φ>-thoughts are ‘practically 
oriented’ thoughts about o iff 
(i) S’s grasp of <α> sets a goal for subsequent belief-forming moves, so that S’s <α is 
Φ> beliefs would be in good order iff arrived at by means that tending towards fulfilment 
of this goal; and 
(ii) <α is Φ> beliefs that meet these standards will tend towards matching what o is like.  
 
We have already seen the classical/practical distinction illustrated for the case of 
descriptive thoughts. The scholars’ <Tremulous Hand> thoughts are classically oriented 
thoughts about the satisfier (if there is one) of the description ‘the author of these 
glosses’. Grasp of the description sets a template for formation of <Tremulous Hand was 
Φ> beliefs; beliefs formed in conformity to this template will tend towards matching 
what the satisfier of the description (if there is one) is like. In contrast, your <Casa 
Nostra> thoughts are practically oriented thoughts about the house (if there is one) 
towards which good house-buying deliberations draw you. Your understanding of ‘Casa 
Nostra’ consists in adoption of a description as setting a goal for formation of <Casa 
Nostra> beliefs. Formation of a <Casa Nostra is Φ> belief is in good order iff it tends 
towards non-lucky fulfilment of this goal.  
The next section develops an account of demonstrative thoughts as practically 
oriented singular thoughts about particulars (an account, as I shall say, of ‘practical 
acquaintance’) and shows how this account generates the solution to the problem of 
                                                 
18 Again, compare Velleman 2000; Boghossian 2005. 
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empty singular thought that I advertised in §1. The final section will compare this 
practical proposal with classical alternatives. 
 
 
§4 Practical acquaintance 
  
I shall present the ‘practical acquaintance’ proposal as an account of how two 
basic explanatory requirements on views of demonstrative thought are to be met. The first 
is that a view of demonstrative thought should enable us to explain how the <That is Φ> 
beliefs we form by ordinary perception-based means are justified: these beliefs are 
justified; we should be able to explain how they are. The second is that a view of 
demonstrative thought should entail that, except in cases of reference failure, our 
demonstrative thoughts are about mind-independent objects. (There are extreme views 
that involve denying that our demonstrative thoughts are about mind-independent things, 
or denying that <That is Φ> beliefs formed by ordinary means are justified. But it would 
take us too far afield to consider these extreme views here.) 
The section is structured as follows. §4.1 sets out an element that I suggest 
practical and classical views of demonstratives should share: a suitable appeal to 
empirical facts about perception. §4.2 uses the account of practical aboutness-fixing from 
§3 and the empirical conclusion extracted from §4.1 to build an account of grasp of a 
demonstrative as practical acquaintance. §4.3 explains the practical solution to the 
problem of empty singular thought.  
 
§4.1 The empirical basis of demonstrative thought 
 
An account of aboutness-fixing for demonstrative thought is an account of how 
perception enables us to think about things in the world. Such an account must be 
informed by relevant empirical facts about how perception works. But there is an ever-
growing wealth of empirical findings about perception. So anyone wanting to develop an 
account of aboutness fixing for demonstrative thought faces an immediate question: 
Which empirical findings are relevant to this philosophical enterprise? 
One advantage of the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION-based framework outlined in 
§3.3 is that it generates an answer to this question. Given REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION, 
a perceptual link enables demonstrative thought about o iff it secures that, in general, if S 
is justified in believing <That is Φ> on the basis of the link, S will be unlucky if o is not 
Φ and not merely lucky if it is. So the empirical story we are looking for will be at least a 
story about a reliable pathway from a perceptual link with an object to formation of 
<That is Φ> beliefs: a pathway that will tend to deliver <That is Φ> beliefs only if the 
object at the end of the perceptual link is Φ.  
It is obviously not possible to undertake an exhaustive investigation of this 
empirical story in a paper whose primary focus lies elsewhere. But it is possible to sketch 
as much of the story as we are going to need.19 
                                                 
19 What follows draws on the discussion of perceptual ‘constancy’ and ‘equivalence’ in 
Palmer 1999 ch. 7.  
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Let us start with a familiar example. Suppose you are watching a coin spin slowly 
in front of you. There is an intuitive sense in which the coin’s shape ‘looks different’ as it 
turns: seen heads-on, the coin looks round; as it turns, it looks like a flatter and flatter 
ellipse, then a skinny rectangle, then an ellipse again. But there is also an intuitive sense 
in which the coin’s shape appears unchanging: you seem to see a stably-shaped thing 
presenting different angles to you, not a thing whose shape is changing. And, in an 
ordinary circumstance, when you form a perception-based belief about the thing, it is the 
appearance of stability that prevails: you believe that the thing is a turning disc. (I shall 
use the terms ‘feature-level appearance’ to talk about the aspects of your experience that 
change in this kind of case, and ‘property-level appearance’ to talk about the aspects that 
remain the same: as you watch the coin, you experience a succession of changing feature-
level appearances and an unchanging property-level appearance.20)  
This example illustrates two fundamental aspects of the empirical story about our 
formation of perception-based <That is Φ> beliefs.  
The first is that our perceptual processing does not deliver just an array of feature-
level appearances which we must then think about how to bundle up into a world of 
objects and properties. If it did, your perceptual feed when you look at the coin would be 
restricted to feature-level appearances (the appearances of roundness, ellipticality, flatter 
ellipticality, and so on). Rather, our perceptual processing delivers an informational feed 
in which basic calculations from the two-dimensional array of features to properties 
attributed to things have already taken place. It is because your perceptual processing 
when you look at the coin includes these calculations that your experience seems like an 
experience of a stably-shaped thing presenting different angles to you.  
The second aspect of the empirical story that the ‘turning coin’ case brings out is 
that our tendencies to form <That is Φ> beliefs are keyed to property-level appearances 
rather than feature-level appearances Unless there is something unusual about the 
situation, you will form the belief you express by saying ‘That is a spinning disc’, rather 
than the beliefs you would express by saying ‘That is round’; ‘Now it’s elliptical’; ‘Now 
it’s rectangular’. 
The initial example brings out these aspects of the empirical story for the case of 
shape. But the same structure is replicated across the range of perception-based beliefs 
attributing observational properties. For example, as something moves away from you 
there is a sense in which it ‘looks’ smaller, but also a sense in which it ‘looks’ the same 
size. It ‘looks’ smaller in that it occupies a smaller proportion of your visual field. It 
‘looks’ the same size because your perceptual processing takes note of ‘depth cues’ in 
your visual field to calculate its apparent distance, and calculates size properties by 
combining apparent distance with proportion of visual field. And, again, when it comes to 
forming <That is Φ> beliefs, your default tendency is to go with property-level 
information rather than mere feature-level information: you form the belief you would 
express by saying ‘That is moving away’, rather than the belief you would express by 
saying ‘That is shrinking’. We could tell similar stories about property-from-feature 
calculations and the formation of <That is Φ> beliefs for colour; motion; texture; and 
solidity. 
                                                 
20 Compare the distinction between the ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ modes of perception at 
Palmer 1999 p313. 
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The connection between REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION and these aspects of the 
empirical story about formation of <That is Φ> beliefs emerges when we add a basic 
observation. The pathway to <That is Φ> belief that we have just described tends to 
deliver results that match what the object at the end of the perceptual link is like iff this 
object is an ordinary material object encountered in ordinary circumstances. 
To see this, suppose you are looking at a strange object whose shape properties 
and reflectance-of-light properties are radically anomalous. This object starts out round, 
then, in the space of a few seconds, compresses into an ellipse, then into a skinnier 
ellipse, then into a flat rectangle, before expanding through shades of ellipticality back 
into a circle. Meanwhile, the object absorbs and reflects light in a non-standard way. The 
overall result is that the shape and orientation cues picked up by your visual system are 
the same cues as you pick up when you look at a turning coin. In this case, your visual 
system will make the same property calculations based on the same feature cues. But the 
<That is Φ> beliefs you form based on these property calculations will not tend to get the 
object’s properties right. Given this object’s ways of behaving, your ordinary pathways to 
formation of <That is Φ> beliefs will tend to generate beliefs that do not match its shape 
properties; if you end up with a <That is Φ> belief that does match the thing’s shape, this 
will be a matter of quite spectacular chance. 
And, again, this observation generalises. The visual system uses a series of 
algorithms to calculate the perceptual property information that serves as input for 
formation of <That is Φ> belief. These algorithms result in reliable belief formation only 
given perceptual encounters with objects that behave the way ordinary objects behave in 
ordinary circumstances. 
The final aspect of the empirical story about formation of <That is Φ> beliefs that 
will be relevant in what follows is the role of perceptual selective attention. ‘Perceptual 
selective attention’ is the process that highlights elements of perceptual input for 
additional processing. For example, consider your visual field as you look at this page. 
As you read, one cluster of words after another leaps out in more detail than the rest. At 
each moment, the part of your visual field that is being processed to this higher resolution 
is the part in the spotlight of your visual selective attention.21 
Selective attention is selection for enhanced perceptual processing. And ‘property 
from feature’ calculations involve processing beyond the initial two-dimensional array of 
features. So it is to be expected that there will be a connection between these calculations 
and selective attention. And in fact there is solid empirical evidence for the conclusion 
that, though there are some ‘property from feature’ calculations outside the attentional 
spotlight, it is only within the spotlight that these calculations deliver rich property 
information with any reliability.22 (To get an intuitive grasp of this evidence, consider 
your experience of objects currently in your unattended peripheral vision. Imagine that 
you have just come into the room, and the objects are of unfamiliar kinds, so that you 
have only whatever information your unattended peripheral vision is giving you. Now 
suppose you are asked to say what the objects are like. You will probably be able to 
provide some basic information – that there is something dark coloured there; that there is 
something curved; that there is something else with sharp edges. And you will be better 
                                                 
21 Compare Palmer 1999 532. 
22 For a summary see 1999 554-563. 
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than chance at ‘binding’ the more obvious features together (saying whether ‘dark 
coloured’ and ‘sharp edges’ apply to the same object). So your unattended perceptual 
processing is carrying out some ‘property from cue’ calculations. But it is carrying out 
only very basic calculations (there may seem to be a sharp-edged dark-coloured object in 
unattended peripheral vision; there will not seem to be something dark green and cubical; 
unattended perceptual processing cannot rise to that level of precision). And it is not 
carrying out these calculations very reliably: ‘better than chance’ performance is not 
reliable performance. It is only within the attentional spotlight that ‘property from 
feature’ calculations deliver either reliability or fineness of resolution. 
Putting all these aspects of the empirical story together, we get what I shall call 
the ‘empirical basis of demonstrative aboutness fixing’:  
 
The empirical basis of accounts of demonstrative aboutness-fixing – <That is Φ> beliefs 
formed in the ordinary way in ordinary circumstances on the basis of an attentional 
perceptual link with an ordinary object will tend to match what the object is like.  
 
To see why the empirical basis deserves its label, compare it with the following 
REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION-based characterisation of accounts of demonstrative 
aboutness-fixing: 
 
An account of demonstrative aboutness-fixing will be an account of how the kind of 
perceptual link that enables demonstrative thought secures the result that a body of <That 
is Φ> beliefs justified on the basis of this kind link with an object will tend to match what 
the object is like.  
 
The empirical basis provides us with a not-yet-normative skeleton for the kind of account 
of demonstrative aboutness-fixing that REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION requires. So given 
the empirical basis, the problem of providing an account of demonstrative aboutness-
fixing becomes the problem of closing the gap between the normative claim we want and 
the not-yet-normative skeleton for this claim that we already have. The distinction 
between practical and classical accounts of demonstrative thought is a distinction 
between views of how this gap should be closed.  
 
§4.2 Demonstrative aboutness-fixing as practical acquaintance 
 
 To get the account of demonstrative aboutness fixing as practical acquaintance on 
the table, let us go back to the general characterisation of practically oriented thought 
about particulars derived in §3.3. Adapting this general characterisation to the specific 
case of demonstrative thought, we get the following: 
 
S’s <That is Φ>-thoughts are ‘practically oriented’ thoughts about o iff 
(i) S’s grasp of <that> sets a goal for subsequent belief-forming moves, so that S’s <That 
is Φ> beliefs are in good order iff they are arrived at by means that tend towards 
fulfilment of this goal; and 
(ii) if S makes only moves that are in good order relative to these standards, his or her 
<That is Φ> beliefs will tend towards matching what o is like.  
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Different practical accounts of demonstrative thought will be generated by different 
accounts of how the goal-setting at (i) works. 
 There are ways to fill in the practical framework that will yield descriptivist 
practical proposals. For example, the claim might be that the goal-setting description for 
a demonstrative is ‘the salient object’. According to this proposal, your goal when you 
form <That is Φ> beliefs is that these beliefs be about the salient object. The description 
‘the salient object’ plays a practical rather than classical standard-setting role because 
there is no saying in advance which object is salient; an object is made salient by the fact 
that a body of beliefs is being maintained in sensitivity to it.  
The possibility of a non-descriptivist practical view (an account of perceptual 
demonstrative aboutness-fixing as practical acquaintance) emerges when we put a little 
pressure on the notion of a ‘goal setting’ mental state. So far I have been writing as if a 
goal-setting mental state is always an intention. But an intention is a propositional 
attitude: to have an intention is to intend to bring it about that p, where p is a proposition 
specifying the intended outcome. So if a goal-setting mental state is always an intention, 
someone wanting to develop a practical account of perceptual demonstrative thought will 
be stuck with a descriptivist, or at least a conceptualist, proposal: a proposal according to 
which the goal-determining intention is <I intend to represent the salient object> or <I 
intend to represent some thing outside the mind>.  
But in fact there are good reasons to think that there is a family of goal-setting 
mental states that do not have propositional content. This is the family of basic 
psychological needs or compulsions. It is a familiar point that we have emotional needs 
and compulsions, for example, the need to avoid loneliness, and the compulsion to act 
aggressively. But having recognized emotional needs, it is hard to see grounds to resist 
the claim that there are also rational needs: needs we have in virtue of the fact that we are 
rational beings, and the having of some of which is constitutive of rationality. Some 
philosophers’ accounts of our rational lives already appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to 
rational needs or compulsions: the need for knowledge23; the need to understand 
oneself24; the need to avoid epistemic blame25; the compulsion to make basic inferential 
moves when presented with simple premisses26. I suggest that the need to represent is a 
basic rational need belonging to this same family: the mind has a basic need to represent 
things outside itself. This need sets the goal associated with an instance of perceptual 
demonstrative <that>; a <That is Φ> belief is justified iff it is formed by means that tend 
towards securing and sustaining representation. 
A full defence of the practical proposal would go into more detail about the need 
to represent. But I am aiming to say just enough to establish the ‘practical acquaintance’ 
model as a contender in the debate about demonstrative aboutness-fixing, and show how 
                                                 
23 Aristotle writes ‘All men by nature desire to know.’ (Metaphysics Book 1 part 1) 
24 Velleman 2000 20-24; 2007a xx. 
25 Boghossian says that the most basic inferences transmit warrant in virtue of 
instantiating epistemically ‘blameless’ patterns (2003 esp. 278-279). This account 
requires that basic inference is not itself a matter of thinking ‘Pattern X is blameless; this 
step is in accord with pattern X; so I may take this step’. 
26 Peacocke 1992 6-8. 
 19 
it generates an alternative to extant (classical) solutions to the problem of empty singular 
thought. So, rather than pausing to defend the claim that we have a basic need to 
represent, or to say more about what this need is like, I shall adopt the claim as a 
supposition, and move on. 
With the pieces now on the table, the ‘practical acquaintance’ model of 
demonstrative thought can be presented as follows.  
Recall the explanatory requirements on a right account of demonstrative thought 
from the start of the section:  
 
(a) An account of demonstrative thought should enable us to explain how the <That is Φ> 
beliefs we form by ordinary perception-based means are justified (that is, we should take 
it that these beliefs are justified, but must be able to explain how they are). 
(b) An account of demonstrative thought should entail that, except in cases of reference 
failure, our demonstrative thoughts are about mind-independent objects.  
 
Now suppose a practical framework: 
 
1 The mind has a basic need to represent things outside itself. Formation of a body of 
<that> beliefs in response to an attentional perceptual feed is a process selected by this 
need as a means to its fulfilment.  
 
The ‘practical acquaintance’ account of demonstrative aboutness-fixing is an account of 
how this framework fulfils explanatory requirements (a) and (b). 
 Note first that, in general, a process selected by a motivational state runs to 
completion in good order iff it does so in a way that tends to generate the state’s 
fulfilment, and a belief-forming process runs to completion in good order iff the resulting 
belief is justified. So we can move from 1 to  
 
2 A <that> belief formed in response to an attentional perceptual feed is justified iff  
formed in a way that tends towards securing and sustaining the status of the <that> 
conceptual representation as referring to a thing outside the mind. 
Now add REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION (3) and the empirical conclusion from §4.1 (4): 
 
3 <α> refers to o iff, in general, justified <α is Φ> beliefs will tend to get o’s properties 
right.  
 
4  A <That is Φ> belief formed on the basis of an attentional link by ordinary means tend 
to get the properties of the attended object right iff it is an ordinary object. 
 
But recall that we are taking it that beliefs formed in this way are justified – the problem 
is to explain how they are (see the first explanatory requirement on p*). 27 So we can 
combine the claim that the beliefs are justified with 4 to give 
                                                 
27 In Dummett’s terms, what is required is an ‘explanatory justification’ for the claim that 
these beliefs are justified, rather than a ‘suasive justification’, which would be an 
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5 A <That is Φ> belief formed in the ordinary way on the basis of perceptual link with an 
ordinary object is both a justified belief, and a belief formed in a way that tends to get the 
attended object’s properties right.  
 
5 and 3 entail 
 
6 A <That is Φ> belief formed in the ordinary way on the basis of an attentional link with 
an ordinary object is about the object.  
 
With 6, we have met the second explanatory requirement – we have the result that, except 
in cases of reference failure, a <That is Φ> belief formed by ordinary means is about a 
thing outside the mind.  
To deliver on the first explanatory requirement (the account of how <That is Φ> 
beliefs are justified, think of what it is like keeping visual track of a ‘thing’ that is not an 
ordinary object, for example, a ripple moving across the surface of a lake or a raindrop 
running down a window. Attention can be drawn to such things without conceptual 
guidance (detection of motion is a very common attention-grabbing ‘cue’). But most 
ripples and raindrops behave in ways that ordinary objects do not: ripples and raindrops 
move in ways that do not respect stable boundaries; they routinely split apart and fuse 
together with other ripples and raindrops; and so on. Most of the time, if your attention is 
caught by a ‘thing’ that is not an ordinary object, the visual object will display its non-
ordinary-objecthood almost immediately – before you have time to form a <That is Φ> 
belief. And when non-ordinary-objecthood is displayed, you will either lose track of the 
thing (your attention will wander elsewhere) or you will begin to devote conceptual 
resources to tracking it. In the first kind of case, the attentional link is too short-lived for 
you to start essaying <that> beliefs. In the second, the result is a complex demonstrative 
thought – <That ripple is moving fast>; <That raindrop is reaching the bottom of the 
pane> – rather than a simple demonstrative thought of form <That is Φ>. It is only where 
the ripple or raindrop (or reflection or shadow…) conceals its non-ordinariness that you 
will end up with a body of <That is Φ> beliefs formed on the basis of an attentional link 
with a non-ordinary ‘thing’. There are such cases. But they are vanishingly rare.  
But since such cases are rare, we can move from 6 to a corresponding reliability 
claim:  
 
7 Formation of <That is Φ> beliefs in the ordinary way on the basis of attentional links is 
a reliable means of forming beliefs that are about things outside the mind. 
 
Now 7 combines with 3 to give the practical explanation for the justification of <That is 
Φ> beliefs formed by ordinary means:  
 
                                                 
argument for the claim that they are justified. For the ‘suasive’/ ‘explanatory’ distinction 
see for example, Dummett 1978  296. 
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8 The <That is Φ> beliefs that we form on the basis of attentional links in ordinary ways 
are justified because forming these beliefs is a reliable means to fulfilment of the mind’s 
basic need to represent.  
 
And that is the account of demonstrative aboutness-fixing that I want to propose. The last 
part of the section shows how this account generates a solution to the problem of empty 
singular thought. 
(Note that 8 is an alternative to standard accounts of how perception justifies the 
simplest perception-based beliefs. But it would take us too far afield to consider in detail 
the possibilities for an account of propositional knowledge based on perception that this 
alternative account opens up.) 
 
§4.3 Practical acquaintance and the problem of empty singular thought 
 
 Recall the problem of empty singular thought from §1, this time presented as an 
argument for the conclusion that demonstrative thoughts are not singular. 
 
1 The <That is Φ> belief formed in a case like Case 1 (where you form a <That is Φ> 
belief on the basis of a perceptual link with a mereological gryphon consisting in parts of 





















6 Demonstrative thoughts are descriptive, not singular. 
 
 In §1, I promised a response to this challenge that rejects 3 – the claim that there 
can be justification only where there are truth conditions. With the account of perceptual 
demonstrative reference fixing as practical acquaintance in place, I can now deliver on 
this promise. The ‘practical acquaintance’ model entails that in a Case 1 situation 1 and 2 
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are both true and 3 false: the subject is justified in forming a belief that has no truth 
conditional content. 
 Let us establish the ‘no truth-conditional content’ part of this claim first. The 
‘practical acquaintance’ model entails that the subject’s belief in a Case 1 situation has no 
truth conditions (there is no state of affairs that would make the belief true) because it 
entails that the truth conditions for a <That is Φ> belief (if it has truth conditions) are 
determined by a relation to the object it is about: no object; no truth conditions. To get 
clear on this point, let us suppose that S is in a Case 1 situation, and try to assign truth 
conditions to S’s beliefs. We can start with  
 
(i) If S had been attending to an ordinary object and had formed a <That is Φ> belief, S’s 
belief would have been true iff the attended object was Φ.  
 
But (i) will not sustain the move to  
 
(ii) S’s <That is Φ> belief would have been true iff the attended object had been an 
ordinary object and that object had been Φ.  
 
For (ii) has to be read as something like  
 
(iii) S’s <That is Φ> belief would have been true iff S’s state of attending to a 
mereological gryphon had in fact been a state of attending to an ordinary object, and that 
object had been Φ. 
 
And (iii) is incoherent. A state of attending to something is a relational state. When you 
are attending to o, you are in the state of attending-to-o. If you had attended to something 
else, you would have been in a different attentional state. So instead of (iii) we have to 
say  
 
(iv) If, in a situation indistinguishable by S from S’s actual situation, but involving 
attention to an ordinary object rather than a mereological gryphon, S had formed a <That 
is Φ> belief, this belief would have been true iff the attended ordinary object had been Φ.  
 
But (iv) is not an account of what it would take for the <That is Φ> belief S in fact forms 
on the basis of attention to the mereological gryphon to be true.  
 
 What about the ‘justification’ part of the claim? Here the point is just that the 
subject’s position in a Case 1 situation is like Robin Hood’s position in a situation where 
he takes a perfectly executed shot, but gets unlucky (an earthquake; a freak gust of 
wind…). In this case, Robin’s movements as he aims and fires are still in normative good 
order because they are reliable generators of the fulfilment of the motivational state that 
lies behind them (the intention to hit the target). It is just that the world does not 
cooperate, so a pattern of movement that is in normative good order because it is a 
reliable generator of fulfilment of the motivational state that drives it is, happens, in this 
instance, to fail to deliver the usual result. Similarly, according to the ‘practical 
acquaintance’ model, <That is Φ> beliefs formed on the basis of an attentional perceptual 
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feed are justified because they are formed by a process that is a reliable generator of 
fulfilment of the motivational state that drives it – the mind’s need to think about things 
outside itself. A case where there is no ordinary object at the other end of the attentional 
link is a case where the world is failing to cooperate, and a normally reliable method fails 
to produce the usual result.  
The last section of the paper provides a brief comparison between this treatment 
of empty perceptual demonstrative thought and classical alternatives. 
 
 
5 Empty singular thought in a classical framework 
 
 Recall the general account of classical aboutness-fixing from the end of §3: 
 
S’s <α is Φ>-thoughts are ‘classically oriented’ thoughts about o iff  
(i) S’s grasp of <α> sets a template for subsequent belief-forming moves, so that S’s <α 
is Φ> beliefs are in good order iff arrived at by moves conforming to this template; and 
(ii) if S makes only moves that are in good order relative to these standards, S’s <α is Φ> 
beliefs will tend towards matching what o is like.  
 
A classical account of demonstrative aboutness-fixing will treat our <That is Φ> thoughts 
according to this general rubric, with differences between classical accounts resulting 
from different views about how the template-setting at (i) works.  
 For example, one suggestion – a suggestion that generates a classical descriptivist 
account of demonstrative thoughts – is that grasp of a demonstrative involves grasp of a 
descriptive condition, such as <the cause of this experience>28, which sets a template for 
formation of <That is Φ> beliefs, so that justification for believing <That is Φ> is derived 
from justification for believing <The cause of this experience is Φ>, and the aboutness-
fixing story parallels the story we told for <Tremulous Hand>. 
 An alternative suggestion, which yields an account of demonstrative aboutness-
fixing as classical acquaintance, is to say that thinking a demonstrative thought involves 
standing in a relation to an object that lets the object itself provide the template for 
subsequent belief-forming operations. Very roughly, the idea here will be that attending 
to an object is like focussing a telescope. If a telescope is focussed on o, the telescope is 
working properly iff it delivers a stream of information that matches what o is like, so o 
provides the template to which the telescope’s information-delivery processes must 
conform if they are to run to completion in good order. Similarly, according to a 
‘classical acquaintance’ view, if you are forming <That is Φ> beliefs on the basis of an 
attentional link with o, the information-processing that generates your beliefs is 
functioning in good order iff the beliefs it delivers match what o is like. So, just as in the 
telescope case, o itself is providing the template to which your <That is Φ> belief-
forming moves must conform if they are to be in good order.29 
 There are many variations on classical views that might be explored at this point. 
But I suggest that all variations face the same hard choice when it comes to cases where 
                                                 
28 Compare Searle 1983. 
29 This is (roughly) the view in Campbell 2002. 
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demonstrative reference fails. The hard choice is brought out by the following line of 
argument. 
 
1 Suppose a classical framework for an account of demonstrative thought: grasp of a 
demonstrative establishes a template for formation of <That is Φ> beliefs; a <That is Φ> 
belief is justified iff formed in conformity to this template; the demonstrative refers to o 
iff in forming beliefs in conformity to the template the subject will tend to get o’s 
properties right.  
 
Now consider a Case 1 situation – a situation where S believes <That is Φ> on the basis 
of an attentional link with a mereological gryphon consisting in parts of a number of 
different things that S’s visual system is being fooled into treating as a single ordinary 
object. Within the classical framework supposed at 1, we will have to say 
 
2 In a Case 1 situation, either (i) S’s attentional link establishes a template for formation 
of <That is Φ> beliefs, or (ii) it does not. 
 
3 If S’s attentional link does not establish a template (option 2.ii), the classical framework 
entails that there is no account of what it would be for the process of <That is Φ>-belief 
formation to run to completion in good order. In that case, there are no standards of 
justification for S’s <That is Φ> belief, so the belief cannot count as justified.  
 
4 If S’s link with the mereological gryphon does establish a template (option 2.i), S’s 
<That is Φ> belief may be justified, but there is still a question as to whether it is about 
the attended ‘thing’.  
 
5 If S’s belief is about the attended ‘thing’, the range of <that> thoughts includes not only 
thoughts about ordinary objects, but also about shadows, ripples, mereological gryphons, 
dots on screens, and any other ‘thing’ that can catch and hold attention.  
 
6 If S’s belief is not about the attended object, justification for a <That is Φ> belief 
involves conformity to a template that can be in place even though there is no object that 
the belief is about. But if the template can be in place even though there is nothing the 
belief is about, it is not a template that is being provided by the object the belief is about 
itself. Rather, it must be a descriptive template: justification for a <That is Φ> belief 
involves conformity to a descriptive template secured by the attentional channel; the 
belief is about something iff there is a thing that matches the template. But if justification 
for <That is Φ> beliefs involves conformity to descriptive templates, <That is Φ> 
thoughts are not singular. 
 
So the classical framework forces a choice between the following three options: 
(A) Deny that our ordinary demonstrative thoughts are singular. (This is the view at 6.) 
(B) Deny that a Case 1 example is really a case of aboutness failure, that is, allow that 
every visual object that could potentially grab or hold our attention is a potential object of 
demonstrative reference. (This is the view at 5.) 
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(C) Maintain that the subject’s <That is Φ> belief in a Case 1 situation is both empty and 
unjustified. (This is the view at 3.) 
 
All three options are represented in the history of classical views of demonstrative 
thought30. But each is a hard pill to swallow.  
(B) is hard to swallow because it sits uneasily with the traditional view of 
demonstratives as providing the basic subject matter of thought. According to this view, 
our grasp of the most basic kind of general thought (a thought like <Something is 
square>) rests on our grasp of the potential reach of demonstrative aboutness-fixing, so 
that (roughly) understanding of ‘Something is square’ rests on knowing what it would be 
for <That is square> to be true for some potential instance of perceptual demonstrative 
‘that’.31 (B) combines with the traditional view to entail that all it takes for <There is 
something square in the room> to be true is for there to be some perspective from which 
some square visual object can grab attention. For example, <There is something square in 
the room> will come out true if no ordinary object is square, but there is some 
perspective from which a subject would be able to attend to a square mereological 
gryphon. I take it that this is at least a highly undesirable result. 
(A) is hard to swallow because it involves giving up the traditional ‘subject matter 
providing’ view of demonstrative reference altogether, as well as rejecting every other 
argument for the claim that demonstrative thought is singular. 
(C) is hard to swallow because it flies in the face of our intuitive view of Case 1-
type examples: the view that a <That is Φ> belief in this kind of case may be justified 
even though there is nothing it is about. 
 I shall not protract the discussion further by exploring the various manoeuvres 
that someone working within a classical framework might make in the attempt to make 
(A), (B), or (C) more palatable. For my aim in this paper has been to establish the 
practical view as an alternative that will let us avoid both the hard decision and the 
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